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ABSTRACT
Companies intending to practice responsible business in areas of conflict are increasingly 
faced with questions about how to engage with stakeholders in order to reconcile their 
competing needs. These questions merit a review of lessons learned from dilemmas in 
environments experiencing different stages of conflict. By 2003, there were already over 63,000 
multinationals employing over 20 million people in developing countries (and 90 million 
globally). Proactive engagement in conflict prevention correlates with avoiding damage to local 
facilities, staff, corporate reputation, and profits. Taken together, these variables influence the 
degree to which corporate financial and social performance can be reconciled in difficult 
operating environments. This article discusses some of the recent successes and failures in 
stakeholder engagement in conflict-affected areas with a view to highlighting recurring 
features of effective policies and practice.
＊ Doctoral Candidate, Graduate Program on Human Security, The University of Tokyo.
1 . INTRODUCTION
Conflicts can turn violent because of any of a number of social, economic or environmental 
factors, such as an increase in refugees or a change in the access rights to vital resources, the 
collapse of a major industry or natural disasters.1 Foreign direct investment (FDI), despite 
lofty intentions, can also exacerbate conflict by changing the allocation of resources in a society 
(Switzer & Hussels, 2004 : 10-12).
From this perspective, violence is preventable and a consequence of conflicts that are 
Dylan Scudder＊
1 　For a delineation of conflict and violence, see Johan Galtung's definition of conflict and concepts of direct, 
structural and cultural violence （Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3, 291-305, 1990, International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo). Though Galtung's models are contested, his definitions of conflict and violence 
remain conceptual icons in the social sciences. For an outline of some of the main issues being debated, see 
Peter Lawler's （1995） book, A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research.
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handled ineffectively. It can be ignited by competition for scarce or dwindling resources, and 
fueled by greed or grievance as it fluctuates through periods of pre-conflict, mid-conflict and 
post-conflict.2 It is against this backdrop that peacebuilding enters as a specific tool of 
intervention that can be mobilized to prevent violence, including the reduction or removal of 
its structural drivers such as institutional arrangements that privilege one group of countries 
at the expense of another group. Given that one of the main structural drivers is poverty, 
corporate intervention at the pre-conflict stage, for instance, often targets economic 
development as an engagement objective. But while such an approach may yield certain 
benefits, it also brings with it new questions related to the role of self-interest and the 
sustainability of profit-oriented organizations engaging in conflict prevention. 
Developing a financial rationale for corporate involvement in an area of conflict is arguably a 
legitimate corporate responsibility from the conventional legal view of a company as an 
organization with fiduciary duties to its shareholders. Yet institutional guidelines on responsible 
business refrain from articulating an explicit approach to conducting conflict-sensitive business 
that meets the needs of investors while at the same time reducing tensions in emerging 
markets, and tend instead to leave such complexities to the invisible hand of market forces.3 As 
such, the prevailing discourse rests on the controversial assumptions that a neoliberal model of 
socio-economic development is achievable and desirable, and that less industrialized countries 
can improve their standing by deregulating their markets and following best practice as 
defined, among others, by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.
1.1. Overview of Context
As we discuss corporate conflict prevention, a working definition of conflict will reconfirm 
the scope of the discussion. The first delineation to make is between the concepts of conflict 
and violence. Conflict is a state of tension in which one party’s goals compete with those of one 
2 　There are many critics of using greed and grievance to explain the drivers of conflict. Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler have defended the greed theory.
3 　For further reading on conflict-sensitive guidelines, see Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's Business, Conflict, 
and Peacebuilding:  An Operational Framework, Pan Kanagaretnam and Susan Brown, Canadian 
Peacekeeping Press (2005), International Alert's Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for 
Extractive Industries (2005), the UN Global Compact and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
(2005) OECD Press, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Trans-national Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003), and Amnesty International's Human Rights Principles for 
Companies (1998), available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/business-and-human-rights. Last accessed 
1/15/13.
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or more other parties, creating frustration that can lead to violent (or non-violent) outcomes 
depending on the degree to which their goals can be made mutually compatible. Violent 
conflict can come about as an outcome of inequitable access to resources, or from a failure to 
distribute wealth over time in ways that satisfy the needs of the majority of stakeholders 
reasonably well.
Most of today's violent conflicts are within states rather than between them. The ‘greed’ 
hypothesis maintains that some conflicts are fought to gain control over valuable natural 
resources within national borders. The ‘grievance’ hypothesis maintains that some conflicts 
are due to development failures, where projects or policies aggravate existing divisions in 
society, often by undermining livelihoods that depend on natural resources. In both cases, 
violence tends to emerge more often in fragile states that are able to exploit their natural 
resources to fund conflict. Valuable resources appear to provide an opportunity, and in some 
cases, a motive, for war (Switzer & Hussels 2004). 
On the whole, the resource view on conflict holds that violent conflict has been the result of 
inequitable access to vital resources, competition between social groups for political power, and 
incompatibilities between groups with different senses of identity, opposing ideologies, or 
irreconcilable value systems. In other words, to claim that the causes of war are determined 
by economics alone would be simplistic. The impact economic dependence on trading oil or 
diamonds can have on funding armed violence is well documented, but there is no consensus to 
date as to whether these have led to ‘resource wars’ per se. In highlighting the contextual 
relationship between natural resources and armed conflict, Humphreys (2005) branches out 
from the greed and grievance hypotheses to posit six types of mechanisms; greedy rebels, 
greedy outsiders, grievance, feasibility, weak states, and sparse networks, elaborating on how 
any of the elements can conspire with another to fan the flames of violent conflict (Humphreys, 
2005: 512-513). In sum, while the recurrence of violence cannot be explained sufficiently by 
economic factors alone, it cannot be denied that resource extraction has played a central role 
in sustaining armed conflict in areas where these assets are abundant. 
The countries referred to as the resource-rich-but-poor vividly illustrate how conflicts today 
resurface primarily in regions suffering from poverty and are often motivated or sustained by 
trade in natural resources or human trafficking. Civilian fatalities in wartime have grown from 
5 per cent at the turn of the century, to 15 per cent during World War I, to 65 per cent after 
World War II, to over 90 per cent in the wars of the 1990s.4 But, although natural resources 
4 　Report by Graca Machel, UN Secretary-General's Expert on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. 
Full report at: http://www.unicef.org/graca/patterns.htm. Accessed 01/20/13.
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such as oil, diamonds, and timber have contributed to untold suffering in times of war in 
countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, there are also examples of business serving a 
stabilizing function in countries recovering from conflict by providing, among other benefits, 
economic alternatives for ex-combatants. 
According to Nelson (2000), this was the case with the AGRIMO company in Mozambique 
in the 1990s. The company established a cotton out-growers scheme for small-scale producers, 
providing seeds, micro-credit and know-how, with the government setting prices. After 17 
years of civil strife, the country signed a peace agreement in 1992 and held its first elections in 
October of 1994. From 1995 to 1996, about 1,000 farmers produced 80 tons of cotton. Growth 
continued and by 1998, some 15,000 farmers were supplying 5,000 tons to AGRIMO (Nelson, 
2000: 72).  While some businesses provide support for technical assistance to target populations 
in conflict-affected areas for the reintegration of vulnerable populations, others such as 
AGRIMO have programs aimed at proactively helping populations at risk of livelihood 
vulnerability. (Saperstein and Campbell, 2007 : 78-79). With AGRIMO’s increased trade 
capacity and its programs to bring about widespread wealth creation in support of local 
livelihoods, it stands as an example of how mutual gains can be generated through corporate 
intervention in a post-conflict scenario, but does not address the question of how companies 
might intervene at the pre- or mid-conflict stages.
1.2. Issues Around Corporate Intervention
To demonstrate how their business activities help to deescalate social tensions in what are 
euphemized by the United Nations as difficult operating environments, Western companies, for 
example, are often quick to defend their presence in conflict-affected countries with the 
argument that they are providing employment and thereby ‘contributing to the local 
economy’ (Powell et al, 2011: 2). Bird and Herman (2004) put this assertion in question and 
take a closer look at the extent to which the notion of ‘creating jobs reduces poverty’ actually 
stands up under scrutiny.5 The summary of their findings from British and American tobacco 
companies in Africa was that: 
“[(1) High technology] business activities do not easily provide job opportunities for 
largely unskilled or semi-skilled indigenous people living in rural areas [but that (2) 
Nonetheless] looking over a 30-40 year period, training local staff and providing economic 
5 　For a series of corporate case studies across a range of socio-economic development projects, see Herman 
and Bird's International businesses and the challenges of poverty in the developing world, 2004, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York.
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and technical assistance would have strengthened the local economy and the corporate-
community relationship.” (Bird & Herman, 2004 : 124-138) 
The authors observe that in the context of tobacco farming, core indicator of social impact is 
compensation for the inevitable disruptions that an international business brings to a local 
community. Together with two dozen researchers from developed and developing countries 
they conducted field studies with firms in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Vietnam, Guyana, and the 
Nunavik region of northern Canada to design strategies firms might adopt to enhance their 
own assets and those of the areas in which they operate. They conclude that returns must be 
shared and sustained over the long term in an equitable manner to have any positive economic 
impact, and argue that there are three principles that need to be taken into account in 
assessing the social responsibilities of international business firms in developing areas:
“[1] an awareness of the historical and institutional dynamics of local communities. This 
influences the type and range of responsibilities the firm can be expected to assume; it 
also reveals the limitations of any universal codes of conduct, [2] the necessity of non-
intimidating communication with local constituencies, and [3] the degree to which the 
firm’s operations safeguard and indeed improve the social and economic assets of local 
communities.” (Bird & Herman, 2004, pp. 14-33) 
 Building on their fieldwork in Africa and the Americas, the authors review the principles of 
the Caux Round Table, the Sullivan Principles, and the guidelines of the ISO26000, SA8000 and 
OECD, and conclude that there are three criteria upon which to base guidelines if they are to 
be operational: [1] maximize returns for all stakeholders in proportion to the value of their 
contributions, [2] in proportion to their legal claims and [3] in proportion to the risks to which 
their investments have been exposed. (Bird & Herman, 2004 : 111-123). If such guidelines on 
what is essentially stakeholder engagement are to be made operational however, normative 
criteria will have to be combined with instrumental criteria in order to incentivize corporate 
management with its fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders.
2 . WHEN A CORPORATE PRESENCE IS THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE
2.1. Examples from Western Business
For years, Canadian oil and gas company Talisman was under pressure to divest and 
withdraw from Sudan, especially after the Canadian government published its Harker Report, 
which criticized the company for contributing to the conflict. Talisman then sold its shares in a 
　
78 創価経営論集　第37巻第 1・2・3 合併号
Sudanese oil pipeline to an Indian oil and gas company, which was under less pressure to 
adhere to any specific code of conduct. The net effect may be a worsening of the impact of oil 
operations on the conflict. Or, as Daniel Wagner (2004) from the Asian Development Bank 
points out through an example from Indonesia that illustrates some of the lessons learned in 
situ, namely, that divesting from a difficult operating environment is not always in everyone’s 
best long-term interest.6 Wagner explains :
One of the best examples is the Freeport mine in West Papua (formerly, Irian Jaya), 
Indonesia. An NGO sought to have Freeport's PRI [political risk insurance] cancelled for 
alleged violations of the environmental conditions set out in the insurance provided by the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC, a US Government agency) and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, a member of the World Bank Group). 
Because covenants of the insurance appeared to have been breached by the company, 
OPIC cancelled the coverage. Freeport took OPIC to court, had the insurance reinstated, 
and then itself cancelled OPIC's and MIGA's insurance. The NGO's objective of stricter 
environmental compliance backfired. When the insurance was cancelled, Freeport was no 
longer obligated to adhere to strict, internationally accepted environmental regulations 
(Wagner, 2004 : 36).
In practice, especially for industries that are more deeply invested in a conflict zone, such as 
the extractive, telecommunication and heavy construction industries, disinvesting is very rare. 
Despite the extreme controversies over Shell’s operations in Nigeria for example, Basil Omiyi, 
country chair, Shell Nigeria, stated in December 2008 that, “We have been a major player here 
for the past 50 years and […] Shell has no plan to pull out of Nigeria.”7 For these big footprint 
industries, the business case for corporate engagement is more likely to be found in preventing 
exorbitant costs resulting from material or non-material damage, such as costs related to 
litigation and security than in the often heard ‘new business in emerging markets’. But if CSR 
principles are to be made operational in conflict-affected areas, relying on lessons learned from 
a limited set of industries from primarily Western companies would overlook insights from 
other industries and business cultures. 
6 　From the report, Investing in Stability; Conflict Risk, Environmental Challenges and the Bottom Line, 
published by the United Nations Environment Programme and International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) in Geneva in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2004.
7 　Jane Nelson's pyramid uses the categories of compliance, risk minimization and value creation to show a 
scale of proactive thinking. See Nelson's The Business of Peace. The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution, p. 7.
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2.2. Examples from Non-Western Business 
Japan, for example, has a much longer history of CSR than many of those countries 
advocating its practice today. The country’s 17th century Ohmi merchants used an expression, 
sanpo yoshi, (lit. the “three-sided good”), meaning that transactions should be good for sellers, 
buyers, and society. CSR has emerged as a norm in the discussion of business ethics in the 
west, but it is nothing new to Japanese business culture.8 At the global level, too, an exceptional 
example to Japan’s otherwise reserved stance on CSR is its very central role in the Caux 
Roundtable, where Canon’s then chairman, Ryuzaburo Kaku promoted the corporate 
philosophy of cooperation or kyosei.9 To demonstrate how these principles might be carried out 
in practice, we look now at a case of a pioneer of peacebuilding business whose approach 
provides a potential example of how engaging in peacebuilding can be made feasible under 
certain conditions. Kiyoshi Amemiya, president of Yamanashi Hitachi Construction Machinery 
Co., Ltd., reports in his own words that :10
“[We recognized the problem that in] Africa one person is injured by a landmine every 
twenty minutes. In Afghanistan, four children under the age of sixteen die every day, and 
four are injured. In Angola, landmines are buried in an area covering 420,000 square 
kilometers, larger than the land area of Japan. The reasons for so many children among 
the victims are that, first of all, children are closer to the ground and more likely to be 
injured in a blast, and second, they try to pick them up, attracted by their colorful 
appearance and shapes, mistaking them for toys. And kids can't read the letters spelling 
‘danger’. Children lose arms and legs during their growing years, and then they are 
wracked by unimaginable pain. Artificial limbs can cost $3,000 each.
But [we asked ourselves] what can a company with only 60 employees accomplish? 
8 　For more information on the historical development of Japanese CSR, see Masahiko Kawamura's (2003) 
paper, Japanese Companies Launch New Era of CSR Management in 2003, NLI Research Institute (Nippon 
Life Insurance Company).
9 　Former Canon chairman, Ryuzaburo Kaku, defined kyosei as: "[a] 'sprit of cooperation' in which individuals 
and organizations live and work together for the common good. A company that is practicing kyosei 
establishes harmonious relations with its customers, its suppliers, its competitors, the governments with 
which it deals, and the natural environment." (The Confucian Roots of Business Kyosei, Journal of Business 
Ethics 48：317-333, 2003)
10　For the full story, see Hitachi's 2005 CSR report: http://www.hitachi.com/csr/csr_images/khoukoku2005.
pdf. One of the many unique points in this case is the fact that it is technically a small company with only 
some 60 employees (though part of the larger parent company). This raises the question of the potential of 
SMEs to be 'sustainable enterprises' (contrary to the public perception that SMEs cannot engage in CSR 
like major companies).
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And this work involved danger. ‘Even for a small-town factory there's a way to contribute 
something to the world. Please help me battle the world's landmines,’ I said. And my 
employees and their families responded positively.
[…A priority] in our design was to support the self-sufficiency of local people. We help 
by providing technology transfers for machinery operation and maintenance, and the 
machine itself is designed to be versatile. By changing the attachments, the people can use 
this machine for more regular work. For example, in a Nicaraguan village, an area where 
the landmines had been cleared away was cultivated and restored as an orchard. Today, 
the village ships 600,000 cases of oranges every year.” 
3 . DETERMINING COMPLICITY
In 2001, the International Peace Academy wrote that companies make themselves part of 
the wider context of conflict by entering or continuing to operate in countries affected by 
chronic human rights abuse, instability, or civil war, or by maintaining business relations with 
local suppliers or distributors in these countries (IPA: 2001).11 The report highlights their 
findings that “any decision corporate leaders make in these circumstances may potentially 
affect the conflict in a positive or negative manner”. Finally, the report confirms that 
establishing the extent to which a corporation is complicit in conflict is central to the notion of 
corporate responsibility, and highlights the fact that no consensus exists on what ‘being 
complicit’ actually constitutes. 
3.1. Complicity Related to Trade
Privatizing peace in the context of trade requires regulating the illicit flow of conflict-
enabling and high-value resources, easily tradable commodities like diamonds, gold, and 
precious gemstones. Similarly, goods that are only slightly less tradable ‒ like forest woods, oil, 
drugs and arms ‒ call for trafficking controls. The German research house, InWEnt, reported 
in 2003 of a Japanese consortium’s involvement in this type of trade-related conflict (Schroeder-
Wildberg and Carius, 2003, p. 20). The report reads :
Four large conglomerates dominate the pulp and paper industry in Indonesia. The Sinar 
Mas/APP and Raja Garuda Mas/APRIL groups represent integrated producers while 
Kiani Kertas and PT Tanjung Enim Lestari are the most important producers of market 
11　See IPA's 2001 report: Private Sector Actors in Zones of Conflict: Research Challenges and Policy 
Responses.
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pulp. […] PT Tanjung Enim Lestari is a joint venture between Indonesia’s Barito Pacific 
Group, a consortium of Japanese investors, and a holding company owned by former 
President Suharto’s eldest daughter. 
According to this account, Japan’s demand for wood has led to an increase in illegal logging 
in Indonesia, which has in turn led to an increase in local conflict and violence. Meanwhile, a 
consortium of Japanese investors (and Suharto’s eldest daughter) continue to export these 
products to the Marubeni corporation in Japan. From a complicity perspective, this begs the 
question of who should be held accountable, and for what. Also, what degree of responsibility 
would the end-users in Japan have in such a case? And to what extent could the shareholders 
of Marubeni bear responsibility for the ongoing conflicts in Indonesia?
3.2. Complicity Related to Products
Causation remains an issue insofar as the correlation between a company’s participation in a 
given country’s economy, and the violence perpetrated in that country by the government or 
rebel groups remains ambiguous. In other words, if a corporation’s activities contribute to the 
revenues of a government at war, then it is sustaining that government and its ability to 
perpetuate violence. The shortage of practical guidelines that can be made operational is 
particularly relevant to conflict-sensitive codes of conduct, as many of the enabling factors that 
perpetuate violent conflict could be prevented if companies would adhere to these codes. Neil 
Cooper helps to explain this dynamic between trade and conflict with an explanation of what 
constitutes conflict goods :12
“Conflict goods are non-military materials, knowledge, animals or humans whose trade, 
taxation or protection is exploited to finance or otherwise maintain the war economies of 
contemporary conflicts. Trade can take place by direct import or export from the conflict 
zone or on behalf of military factions (both government and non-government) by outside 
supporters. Arms, military aid and services of mercenaries, as they may be paid in kind, 
concessions, or cash could be included as conflict goods.”
It remains difficult however to assess the extent to which the provision or deprivation of 
revenues from such products correlates to the scope and intensity of military campaigns  (IPA, 
12　For a full description of conflict goods, see Neil Cooper's chapter, State Collapse as Business: The Role of 
Conflict Trade and the Emerging Control Agenda, p. 180, in Jennifer Milliken's, State Failure, Collapse and 
Reconstruction, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, Oxford.
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2001: 4-5). One example of this was when roads and airstrips built in Sudan by the Canadian oil 
corporation Talisman were used with Talisman's permission by the Sudanese government 
during the civil war to launch attacks on groups in southern Sudan.13 Another example of this 
was when Exxon Mobil hired one or more military units of the Indonesian national army, 
known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, to provide security for its gas extraction project in 
Aceh. The troops set out on an ongoing campaign of systematic torture, murder, rape, and acts 
of genocide against the local Achanese population.14 Under extreme conditions such as these, 
corporate management may be overwhelmed about how exactly to engage in dialogue with 
insurgent groups, many of whom may even become part of the country’s future government 
(Switzer & Ward: 2004). 
Two examples of voluntary initiatives that address the use of products or services to commit 
human rights violations or pursue violent conflict are Amnesty International Human Rights 
Principles for Companies that say ‘companies which supply military security or police 
products or services should take stringent steps to prevent those products and services from 
being misused to commit human rights violations’, and the UN Norms which say that 
‘business enterprises shall refrain from any activity which supports, solicits, or encourages 
states or any other entities to abuse human rights. They shall further seek to ensure that the 
goods and services they provide will not be used to abuse human rights’ (Switzer & Ward, 
2004: 28). After reviewing these instances of preventing complicity, we turn now to more 
proactive approaches of business diplomacy. 
4 . BUSINESS DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS
Becoming increasingly aware that there is no neutral ground for companies in areas of 
conflict, corporate decision makers face a basic dilemma formulated succinctly by Haufler 
(2001): stay and exacerbate the conflict; stay and contribute to a peaceful transformation of 
the conflict; or leave. An additional dimension can be introduced to this three-part structure to 
study the dilemma through a fourfold table (see figure 1). The dilemma of staying or 
withdrawing is a useful point of departure for focusing only on the most pressing decision to 
be made, but the anticipated consequences of staying or leaving should be factored in to map 
the potential impacts of these actions on the conflict areas. This additional dimension serves a 
13　See Gagnon, Macklin & Simons, "Deconstructing Engagement: Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones- 
Implications for Human Rights and Canadian Public Policy." University of Toronto, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 04-07, p. 26, January 2003.
14　For more information, see The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2002：15, p. 190.
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second function of making explicit the (potentially false) dichotomy of staying or withdrawing. 
For instance, it is theoretically possible that a proactive company not in the conflict area could 
engage in peacebuilding in a country in which they currently have no operations. 
Haufler’s description of the below dilemma is “[…] when violence breaks out businesses 
have three general options: withdraw entirely; stay but try to ignore the conflict; and‒a new 
option‒remain invested in a country but work to prevent the escalation of violence” (Haufler, 
2001: 663). In the author’s correspondence with Haufler, the latter included examples of how 
having abundant natural resources can, paradoxically, have a negative effect on a country’s 
ability to meet its own basic human needs (referred to in different contexts as “resource rich 
but poor” countries, the “paradox of plenty”, the “resource curse” or the “Dutch disease”). 
She wrote that it is often referred to as the ‘Dutch disease’, named after the Dutch 
experience with the macroeconomic pitfalls of oil resource development (Haufler, The Private 
Sector and Governance in Post-Conflict Societies, unpublished draft, 2006).
Professor Ian Holliday of the City University of Hong Kong sent the author an article he 
wrote that points to the possibility of Japan’s MNCs assuming a proactively diplomatic role in 
Myanmar.15 His article reminds the reader that diplomats in Tokyo have spent many years 
pondering how to make constructive engagement work, and are concerned about how to 
balance Chinese influence in Southeast Asia (Holliday : 2005b). Chinese corporate leaders 
currently oversee a significant array of MNC representation in Myanmar. This proposal is thus 
in many ways a plausible private-sector extension of Tokyo’s existing involvement with the 
Myanmar problem. 
Furthermore, Japan is ideally placed to secure some degree of US acceptance of a new way 
forward, and might through skillful diplomacy be able to engage the ASEAN states and even 
China. This would stand as an example of corporate peacebuilding as indicated in the above 
Figure 1：Extension of Haufler’s corporate-conflict dilemma （2001）
De-escalate Conflict Exacerbate Conflict
Stay Invested
・Business Diplomacy
Boston-Derry, N. lreland
・Industry-wide Initiatives 
Kimberly Process, S. Africa
・BP in Colombia
・UNOCAL in Myanmar
・Rio Tinto in Chile
Withdraw Texaco et al in Myanmar Talisman in Sudan
15　For a more general summary of arguments in support of corporate intervention, also in regions beyond 
southeast Asia, see Allan and Colletta's Privatizing Peace, p. 155.
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diagram, i.e., a new category of company that engages a difficult operating environment with 
the express intent of easing local tensions within its own sphere of influence. (Holliday: 2005, 
Doing Business with Rights Violating Regimes; Corporate Social Responsibility and Myanmar’s 
Military Junta, Journal of Business Ethics, 61: 329-342).
A further example of business diplomacy is the Consultative Business Movement (CBM), 
which according to UNEP/FI (2004), was established by members of the South African 
business community in the 1980s to promote a peaceful transition from apartheid. Through 
consultations with exiles and leaders from banned or restricted organizations such as the 
African National Congress (ANC), it established relationships between key business people, 
politicians and activists. This permitted CBM to mediate at a critical juncture between the 
government and ANC in the negotiations that led to the 1991 National Peace Accord, and in 
convincing the ANC of relaunching economic growth through a market economy.16 In spite of 
the relative success achieved in these and other cases, skeptics remain unconvinced that the 
private sector has a constructive role to play in conflict areas.
4.1. Mixed Views on Corporate Engagement
As a consequence of globalization, international private sector actors have become more 
influential to the peace, security, and prosperity of developing countries than in previous 
decades, but foreign direct investment (FDI) can have helpful or damaging impacts. The 
nature of the impact depends to some extent on the corporate leaders’ level of conflict 
sensitivity. It is recognized that intentional profiteering from a disenfranchised community or 
from business activities related to violent conflict does not necessarily constitute complicity. 
Conversely, complicity can also be unintentional. As Wagner (2004) observes :17
“A good example of the possible consequences of not paying enough attention to the 
social and environmental issues associated with owning and operating a mine is 
16　From the report, Investing in Stability; Conflict Risk, Environmental Challenges and the Bottom Line, 
published by the United Nations Environment Programme and International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) in Geneva in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. The report is a collection of articles written by John Bray 
(Control Risks Group), Jason Switzer, Mareike Hussels (IISD), Daniel Wagner (Asian Development Bank) 
and Michael Kelly (KPMG).
17　From the report, Investing in Stability; Conflict Risk, Environmental Challenges and the Bottom Line, 
published by the United Nations Environment Programme and International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) in Geneva in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.
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Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 1988 a small group of villagers blew up some 
of the mine’s installations, coming in the wake of demands for compensation for loss of 
land and resources to the project, and alleged pollution of the local river system. Refusal 
by the mine owner and the PNG government to address the demands prompted escalating 
guerrilla action against the mine and its employees. The company closed the mine down 
the following year and it has remained closed. Thousands of people died in an ensuing civil 
war, and litigation against the mine and its owners continues to this day.” 
Proponents of FDI on the other hand maintain that it stimulates economic growth and 
facilitates economic and political liberalization. Under certain circumstances, however, and 
particularly in the natural resource extraction sector, FDI has weakened fledgling states and 
facilitated the outbreak or continuation of violent conflict, regardless of the intentions of the 
particular corporation concerned (IPA, 2001 : 1).18 Giving careful consideration to the potential 
social impacts of a proposed FDI initiative and thinking through the most appropriate alliance 
for conducting business in a volatile area can make the difference between succeeding and 
failing at managing local risk and its repercussions on global reputation. As an example of a 
failed FDI project, Switzer and Hussels cite a public utility project, which triggered a series of 
violent events in Bolivia :
In Cochabamba, Bolivia, more than 40 per cent of the city's inhabitants lack direct 
access to treated water sources. In 1999, Bolivia granted a 40-year privatization lease to 
London based International Waters Ltd., giving it control over the water utility for the 
town. The company increased water charges as a prelude to infrastructure investment. In 
mid-January 2000, residents called a general strike, allegedly in protest against higher 
water prices and lack of measurable access and service improvements. Cochabamba was 
placed under martial law. More than 175 protesters were injured and several more killed 
18　Paris (2002) also explains that, "Among other things, peacebuilders attempt to bring war-shattered states 
into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance, or standards 
that define how states should organise themselves internally. In this respect, the contemporary practice of 
peacebuilding may be viewed as a modern rendering of the mission civilisatrice-the colonial-era belief that 
the European imperial powers had a duty to 'civilise' their overseas possessions. Although modern 
peacebuilders have largely abandoned the archaic language of civilised versus uncivilised, they nevertheless 
appear to act upon the belief that one model of domestic governance-liberal market democracy-is superior 
to all others." See peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'. Review of International Studies (2002), 28, pp. 
637-656.
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in street battles over four days. In concession to the public uprisings, the Bolivian 
government broke the contract that had privatised the region's water system. 
International Waters Ltd. in Bolivia withdrew, claiming some US$40 million in damages. 
The resolution of the urban water crisis in Cochabamba will require, therefore, not only 
compensation for the failed privatisation, but new investment sources, which may be even 
harder to attract in the wake of past violence. (Switzer & Hussels, 2004 : 12).
In spite of these reservations about corporate engagement in conflict prevention, Gerson and 
Colletta claim the private sector can ‘aid the public sector in the area of peace’ because (1) 
the private sector shares an interest in having predictable environments to carry out their 
operations, (2) rebel armies, at least those in Colombia, trust the business community more 
than the government, supposedly because their intermediary skills are superior to those of the 
public sector staff, (3) the private sector is able to identify the financial needs of these rebel 
armies without letting ‘politics and ideology’ get in the way, and (4) because the private 
sector seeks to ‘maximize results from a minimal use of resources’, unlike the public sector. 
There remain however constituencies with strong reservations about corporate involvement in 
what has traditionally been a public sector function, and with significant grounds for said 
reservations related to the private sector’s prioritization of its constituents, adhering to a creed 
of shareholder primacy over the needs of other stakeholders.
From a more pragmatic perspective, Bull and McNeill (2007 : 12-20) developed a typology of 
eight kinds of partnership between companies and international organizations such as the UN 
or development banks, which classify partnerships by organizational structure and objective; 
(1) Resource mobilization partnerships ‒ raising funds for specific goals, i.e. the MDGs, (2) 
multilateral fundraising such as direct private sponsoring of multilateral activities (e.g. P&G 
and UNICEF, IKEA and UNICEF etc.), (3) Channeling private investments to specific 
projects: The World Bank, UNDP, or UNCTAD position themselves to leverage FDI flows to 
those countries where it is most needed, whereas UNIDO is taking a lead role in bringing 
SMEs into the global value chain, (4) Advocacy partnerships: raise awareness concerning the 
global issues addressed by the UN ‒ or add new issues. These typically seek to combine the 
expertise of the private sector, the legitimacy of the UN, and the resources of both partners. 
(5) NetAid ‒ online community for poverty issues launched by UNDP and Cisco Systems or 
UNESCO and the History Channel in Japan (The World Heritage), (6) Policy partnerships: 
one of the main functions is to develop norms and standards, the Global Compact being the 
most important example, (7) Operational partnerships: these range from standard products 
and services from companies to the UN ($3 billion per year), to provision of AIDS medication, 
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risk management support for companies etc., and (8) Secondment between companies and the 
UN/World Bank, sometimes also through fellowship programs (Bull & McNeill, D., 2007: 12-20).
In view of the work accomplished by public-private partnerships such as these, and similar 
initiatives, some NGOs remain optimistic regarding the private sector’s potential for 
constructive engagement (see below diagram from International Alert’s contribution to Jane 
Nelson’s The Business of Peace). The World Bank, too, unreservedly promotes the idea of 
“privatizing peace” (see Gerson & Colleta’s book by the same name). In a chapter entitled 
“The Private Sector : Problem or Panacea?”, they proclaim:
“The private sector has a role in peace processes in myriad ways. The process of peace 
is complex and multi-staged, from peacemaking to peacekeeping and enforcement to 
peacebuilding. To varying degrees of effectiveness, the private sector has an important 
part to play at almost every stage. Moreover, at each step, the rise of globalization and the 
shift in the nature of war only serves to increase the private sector’s influence. 
In speaking of privatizing peace, we suggest injecting the private sector in all UN and 
other multilateral peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacebuilding 
efforts. The anticipated result is greater clarity of mission, better articulation of 
Adaptation of Lederach's Triangle A role for people in business
・　CEO/board of directors/chairman
・　Corporate level policy and
　　public aﬀairs functions
・　Regional/country managers 
　　of MNCs
・　National company CEOs
・　National business 
　　associations
・　Business unit managers
・　Functional experts i. e. 
　　community aﬀairs managers
・　Managers of small and 
　　Medium-sized business 
　　Enterprises
International level
Engagement with home-base
governments, intergovernmental
agencies, international NGOs and
other companies on policy issues,
international guidelines etc.
National/Regional level
Policy dialogue on public sector
Reform/taxation/corruption/
Private sector laws/banking/
Human rights/democratization
Local level
Managing local impacts and
Relationships e. g. workers rights/
Community consultations/
Environmental impacts/ enterprise
Development/NGO capacity bldg. etc
Figure 2 : Adapted from Nick Killick of International Alert, a peacebuilding role for businesspeople (2001)
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performance objectives, and the delineation of measures for judging results in an open, 
transparent and accountable framework.” (Gerson & Colletta, 2002: 34)
Killick’s pyramid above lists some of the basic options for corporate engagement at various 
levels. Similar to Haufler’s dilemma model, however, it leaves out the option for a company to 
proactively engage in an area of conflict with an explicit peacebuilding objective. The US-based 
company, PeaceWorks, is an example of such a company. It creates business opportunities for 
former adversaries to collaborate through commerce rather than engaging in violent 
alternatives. The founder and CEO, Daniel Lubetzky, has initiated several conflict prevention 
projects that have been documented including Israel/Palestine and Chiapas, Mexico. By 
sourcing ingredients from both countries for products that he sells in the US, he is able to 
provide his Israeli and Palestinian partners a viable alternative to fighting each other. He 
informed the author in a telephone interview that in spite of the frequent upheavals in the 
region, his business partners on both sides of the border have continued their collaboration 
now for decades. 
CONCLUSION
The cases discussed above suggest that companies with operations in areas experiencing 
conflict cannot reasonably claim not to have any influence on the communities in those places, 
though the nature of that influence is situational and often complex. Second, the examples of 
companies working in conflict-affected areas indicate that the decision to remain invested or to 
withdraw is multi-faceted and characterized by its inherent uncertainty. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by such initiatives as the United Nations Global Compact and its 
Principles of Responsible Investment or Principles for Responsible Management Education, 
International Alert’s guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and Amnesty International's Human 
Rights Guidelines for Companies, there is a growing body of codes of conduct related to 
businesses in areas of conflict. Though these guidelines address basic challenges businesses 
face when trying to act responsibly in areas of conflict, they have important limitations; most 
notably their absence of enforceability and independent monitoring, and the lack of industry 
specificity ‒ most focusing mainly on the extractive industries (Kolk & van Tulder, 2002, p. 
36).19
19　For a comprehensive study codes of conduct, see Kolk and van Tulden's work on International Codes of
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A further limitation to conflict-sensitive codes of conduct of the past decade has been their 
focus on guidelines for corporate conduct within a fixed geographic area, a “conflict zone”, 
rather than guidelines including a broader range of stakeholders who operate outside the 
conflict zone but who can influence social tensions and are therefore part of the wider conflict 
system (e.g. diaspora, socially responsible investors, shareholder and consumer activists, etc.). 
It is acknowledged that Amnesty International and the UN Norms make reference to products 
and their misuse to commit human rights violations, but this implies exclusion of all products 
sold outside the conflict zone that fund, albeit only in part, corporate actors in conflict zones. In 
other words, if the argument is that companies operating in corrupt regimes serve to sustain 
those regimes, then consumers who support these companies with their continued purchasing 
of those companies’ products also bear a degree of responsibility. 
To sum up, there remains a dearth of empirical research on the barriers to making CSR 
principles more operational in conflict-affected areas. Conflicts are multi no hyphen faceted 
phenomena, and leveraging a company’s core competencies to ease the tensions in a conflict 
zone is easier said than done. And yet, whether or not to continue operating, what level of 
engagement to have, if any at all, and with what intent to continue doing business in the area; 
all these dilemmas remain inescapable. Though there is still too little evidence to establish any 
correlation between ‘doing well by doing good’ in areas of conflict, using a conflict-sensitive 
business approach to probe the business case for corporate conflict prevention has begun to 
yield new insights into this urgent and intriguing investigation. 
＊  Parts of this paper were presented on February 4, 2010 toward completion of a graduate 
course on sustainability taught by Associate Professor Masaru Yarime at the University 
of Tokyo. Other parts were submitted for a journal publication in The University of 
Tokyo's Center for Documentation of Refugees and Migrants Quarterly, volume 8, 2013, 
forthcoming.
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